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Objective To investigate the eﬀect of promoting aﬀective vs. deliberative processing on DA eﬀectiveness based on dual-process
theory.

Keywords: decision-making, decision
aid, dual-process theory, health
psychology

Design, setting and participants One hundred and forty-eight
female university students participated in a randomized controlled
experiment with three conditions: emotion-focused, informationfocused and control. Preference-value consistency, knowledge,
decisional conﬂict and satisfaction were compared across the conditions using planned contrast analyses.
Intervention The intervention comprised two diﬀerent DAs and
instructional manipulations. The emotion-focused condition
received a modiﬁed DA with aﬀective content and instructions to
induce an aﬀective reaction. The information-focused and control
conditions received the same DA without the aﬀective content.
The information-focused condition received additional instructions
to induce deliberative processing.
Results Controlling for the experiment-wise error rate at
P < 0.017, the emotion-focused and information-focused conditions had signiﬁcantly higher decisional satisfaction than the control condition (P < 0.001). The emotion-focused condition did not
demonstrate preference-value consistency. There were no signiﬁcant diﬀerences for decisional conﬂict and knowledge.
Discussion Results suggest that the promotion of aﬀective processing may hinder value-consistent decision making, while deliberative
processing may enhance decisional satisfaction.
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Conclusions This investigation of the eﬀect of aﬀective and deliberative processes in DA-supported decision making has implications for the design and use of DAs. DA eﬀectiveness may be
enhanced by incorporating a simple instruction to focus on the
details of the information.

Introduction
Medical encounters often involve making multiple decisions about tests, treatments and procedures in which there is no single ‘best’ choice
(e.g.1). Guidelines from the International
Patient Decision Aid Standards (IPDAS) Collaboration deﬁne an optimal decision as one in
which the individual has greater knowledge of
the choice options and their features, greater
satisfaction with the decision, lower levels of
decisional conﬂict and greater decision-value
consistency.2,3 For patients to make an optimal
decision, they need to weigh up costs and beneﬁts associated with available options in consideration of their values and speciﬁc needs.4
Making optimal health-care decisions is particularly diﬃcult when the beneﬁt–cost ratio of a
treatment option is small, where options produce similar survival but diﬀerent quality of
life outcomes, or where there is no clear data
on outcomes.
Decision aids (DAs) have been developed to
assist patients in these situations. They are
non-directive tools designed to prepare patients
to make speciﬁc, deliberated choices consistent
with their own values.1 DAs present evidencebased information on the options and outcomes relevant to the patient’s health in a
clear, graphical way and commonly include
exercises to assist patients in clarifying their
values and weighing up the pros and cons.5 A
systematic review found that DAs improve
patients’ knowledge, reduce decisional conﬂict
and motivate people to take a more active role
in decision making.1 Therefore, they serve as a
valuable tool for enabling patients to engage in
shared decision making and make optimal decisions about their health care.
To provide a standardized, evidence-based
framework for DA development, the IPDAS
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Collaboration6 established a quality criteria for
DA development and evaluation. This provides
guidance for developers about using a systematic development process, what information to
provide, and how to present it. Even so, the
IPDAS quality criteria do not stipulate explicit
use of theory and the majority of DAs appear
to have been developed in the absence of an
explicit theoretical hypothesis about how
patients will reach decisions.7 As a consequence, there is a lack of understanding of
how DAs aﬀect outcomes.8 DAs demonstrate
diﬀerent levels of eﬀectiveness, but there has
been insuﬃcient research investigating the
mechanisms responsible for this variability.7–10
Decision-making theories have the potential
to clarify this issue by providing explanations of
how people make choices and identifying the
factors that inﬂuence the decision-making process.7 There is insuﬃcient research to purport
the superiority of any particular decisionmaking theory on which to base DAs; however,
expected utility theory has been the most widely
used approach informing DA developers of the
factors to consider, while dual-process theories
provide a potentially useful alternative perspective (see11,12). Dual-process theories acknowledge both deliberative and aﬀective processes as
integral to decision making.13 They acknowledge the existence of two complementary systems – one logical, controlled, and analytical
and the other aﬀect-based, automatic and intuitive – which operate in parallel with each other
in producing behaviour.13–15 These systems
have been referred to as the analytic and intuitive systems, respectively.13,14
The eﬀectiveness of DAs has been explained
in terms of their inﬂuence on cognitive and emotional processes, which are subsumed by the
analytic and intuitive systems, respectively.11,12
With regard to cognitive processes, DAs have
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been shown to encourage more systematic and
knowledgeable evaluations of the decision information. These are thought to lead to more stable cognitions and thereby reduce decisional
conﬂict and increase satisfaction with the
decision.11,16,17
However, the mechanisms by which DAs
inﬂuence emotional processes and subsequent
outcomes are less clear. DAs have been associated with reducing feelings associated with decisional conﬂict that impact adversely on decision
making.17 However, Bekker et al.11 suggest that
part of the eﬀectiveness of DAs may result from
allowing the expression of decision-relevant feelings that are not usually accessed in unaided
choices. They compared the content of usual
care vs. DA-supported consultations when people were making decisions about prenatal diagnosis for emotional expression, information
seeking and evaluation of the information. People expressed more negative emotions, less positive emotions, more cognitive phrases and
thinking about the decision, and more positive
and negative evaluations of options in the DA
group than those receiving usual care. Information seeking was equivalent across groups. At
the time of decision making, greater emotional
expression was associated with reduced reasoning, and greater decisional conﬂict and anxiety.
At 1-month follow-up, positive evaluations and
information seeking were associated with
increased decisional conﬂict, while positive evaluations were also associated with generation of
fewer reasons for their choice and negative evaluations were associated with lower anxiety. Participants in the DA condition overall evaluated
more information and experienced a decrease in
decisional conﬂict over time, while the usual care
group’s decisional conﬂict scores increased.18
Thus, DAs appear to encourage greater use of
both aﬀective and deliberative strategies, which
overall positively aﬀected short- and long-term
evaluations of the decision outcome.
To date, most theoretical and empirical DA
research has focused on elucidating relevant
cognitive processes rather than examining emotional inﬂuences.11 By adopting a dual-process
approach, the aim of the current study was to

clarify the role of emotional processes in DAs
by assessing the impact of promoting aﬀective
vs. deliberative processing on DA eﬀectiveness.
It is acknowledged that aﬀective and deliberative processing may not be considered as
functioning entirely separately, but rather in a
highly interdependent fashion (e.g.19). However,
it is a useful conceptualization in which to
undertake this exploratory research.
Decision aid eﬀectiveness was considered in
terms of optimal decision making. Diﬀerences in
indicators of an optimal decision were compared
across three conditions distinguished by instructional manipulations to induce aﬀective or
deliberative processing: emotion-focused vs.
information-focused vs. control. It was hypothesized that the promotion of aﬀective or
deliberative processing would inﬂuence decisionmaking outcomes of knowledge of the options
and their features, decisional conﬂict, satisfaction with the decision and preference-value consistency. This was explored using a DA on
contraceptive methods developed speciﬁcally for
this study. This topic was chosen to ensure that
the subject matter would be meaningful to the
predominantly young female target population.

Method
Participants
One hundred and forty-eight female undergraduate students from a large metropolitan university in Sydney, Australia, participated in the
experiment. Participants were given course
credit for an introductory psychology course.
Design
A randomized experimental design was used
including
three
arms:
emotion-focused,
information-focused or control condition. As
shown in Fig. 1, the groups diﬀer by the DA
administered and instructional manipulations
adapted from previous research by Lockenhoﬀ et al.12,20 The emotion-focused group
received an emotion-enhanced DA-containing
modiﬁcations aimed at inducing aﬀective
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Figure 1 Study design.

reaction for the participants plus instructions
to focus on their emotional reactions to the
choice options; the information-focused group
received a standard DA plus instructions to
focus on the details of the information presented, while the control group received the
standard DA and no decision-making guidance,
thereby simulating natural processing (i.e. usual
care). The emotion-enhanced DA was developed
to improve upon the emotion-focused instructional manipulation in the studies by Lockenhoﬀ et al.,12,20 as the instructional manipulation
alone was not successful in eliciting a diﬀerence
in processing style compared with control.
Instructional manipulations
Before reading the DA, participants were asked
to think about: (i) their emotional reactions to
the information given in the DA (emotionfocused condition) or (ii) the speciﬁc details/
facts of the information given in the DA
(information-focused condition). Two additional manipulations during and after reading
of the DA were used to reinforce the salience
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of the initial instructions. Here, participants
rated: (i) the valence of their emotional feelings
about Depo-Provera and Mirena followed
by writing two emotional feelings they felt
about them (emotion-focused condition) or
(ii) how well they remembered the details of
Depo-Provera and Mirena followed by writing two facts they remembered about them
(information-focused condition).
Decision aids
The DAs were presented to participants on
paper.
1. The emotion DA (emotion-focused condition): This DA was identical to the standard
DA, with modiﬁcations aimed at inducing a
strong aﬀective reaction for the participant.
These included emotional images, smiley
faces instead of systematic ovals in the icon
arrays as personlike ﬁgures have been shown
to be more evocative than bar graphs21;
handwriting font for the ‘I’ statements for
the summary of the pros and cons to facilitate understanding that the statements are
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personally applicable and hence make the
information more concrete,22 and speciﬁc
colours shown to be mood arousing (i.e.
‘mood-lifting’).23 The ﬁrst three modiﬁcations were targeted at enhancing the
vividness of the information.22
2. The standard DA (control and informationfocused conditions): This DA presented general information on contraception followed by
more speciﬁc information, including the beneﬁts and risks/side-eﬀects, on the contraceptive
options of Depo-Provera and Mirena.
Accompanying the text in black and white
was images of the contraceptives, explanatory
diagrams, including icon arrays consisting of
100 systematic ovals, and values clariﬁcation
exercises. These are key DA components.
Procedure
After providing informed consent, participants
were randomly allocated to one of the three
groups. They completed an electronic questionnaire immediately before and after reading the
DA and were debriefed after study completion.
Ethics approval was obtained from the university Human Research Ethics Committee.
Measures
Based on IPDAS guidelines, an optimal decision in the current study was operationalized
as: greater knowledge of the options and their
features, greater satisfaction with the decision,
lower levels of decisional conﬂict and greater
preference-value consistency.2,3 Both the preand post-intervention questionnaire assessed
mood, anxiety, personal values regarding contraceptives and preferences for the presented
contraceptive options. The pre-intervention
questionnaire assessed age, religion, ethnicity,
relationship status, contraceptive use and
familiarity with the presented contraceptive
options. The post-intervention questionnaire
included manipulation checks and assessed
contraceptive knowledge, satisfaction with
decision and decisional conﬂict. Figure 1 outlines the schedule of measures.

Aﬀect measures included the validated 20item Positive and Negative Aﬀect Schedule
(PANAS25). Anxiety was assessed using a sixitem short form of the State-Trait Anxiety
Inventory (STAI26).
Participants’ values were assessed by eight
items based on a scale by O’Connor.5 This
included factors relating to the risks/side-eﬀects
and beneﬁts of contraceptive use, and participants were asked to rate their personal importance, on a scale from 0 (not at all important)
to 10 (extremely important), where higher
scores indicate greater importance.
To assess participants’ preferences for the
contraceptive options, they were asked to rate
the strength of their preference separately for
Mirena and Depo-Provera contraceptive
methods, on a scale from 0 (do not prefer this
option) to 10 (strongly prefer this option). As in
this study, the decision between Depo-Provera
and Mirena was hypothetical for participants,
it was more appropriate to ask their preferences
than to make an actual choice.
Four items were used to check whether the
instructional manipulations worked. Participants were asked to rate, on a scale of 0 (not at
all) to 10 (extremely), the extent to which: (i)
they focused on the speciﬁc details/facts of the
DA booklet; (ii) they focused on their emotional
feelings about the options; (iii) they felt positive
and negative emotions; and (iv) the DA booklet
engaged their emotions. Higher scores indicate
higher levels of focus, emotional feeling or emotional engagement. The ﬁrst three items were
adapted from Mikels et al.12
Participants’ knowledge of the DA content,
including contraception in general and the
beneﬁts and risks/side-eﬀects of the speciﬁc
contraceptives, was assessed using 10 purposedesigned true/false items. Higher total scores
indicated greater knowledge. The validated
Satisfaction With Decision (SWD16) scale was
used to assess participant’s satisfaction with
their decision. The validated Decisional Conﬂict
Scale (DCS17) was used to assess factors
related to uncertainty with decision making.
Total standardized scores of 25 or lower are
associated with follow-through with decisions,
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whereas scores that exceed 38 are associated
with delayed decision making.24

Table 1 Demographic characteristics and health information
of the sample in the emotion, information and control
conditions
Emotion
(N = 49)
Mean (SD)

Information
(N = 51)
Mean (SD)

Control
(N = 48)
Mean (SD)

19.59 (3.10)

20.37 (4.64)

19.94 (2.72)

0.43 (1.28)
0.75 (1.94)
0.31 (0.90)
0.69 (2.12)
N (%)
N (%)
Relationship status1
Single
26 (53)
27 (53)
Dating
23 (47)
21 (42)
Married/de
0 (0)
3 (6)
facto
Have had sexual intercourse
Yes
37 (76)
36 (71)
No
12 (26)
15 (29)
Contraceptives used2
Condoms
35 (71)
36 (71)
The pill/
28 (57)
30 (59)
Minipill
Other
8 (16)
2 (4)
Religion
Agnosticism/
27 (55)
23 (48)
Atheism
Christianity
18 (37)
22 (43)
Other
4 (8)
5 (10)
Country/region of birth3
Australia
33 (67)
36 (71)
6 (12)
5 (10)
Europe/
North
America
Asia/Africa
8 (16)
13 (24)
Language other than English spoken at home
Yes
18 (37)
16 (31)
No
31 (63)
35 (69)

0.19 (0.76)
0.42 (1.50)
N (%)

Statistical analysis
All statistical data analyses were conducted
using SPSS Inc. Released 2007. SPSS for
Windows, Version 16.0. Chicago, SPSS Inc. Differences between conditions were assessed using
three planned contrasts, with coeﬃcients 1 0 1,
0 1 1 and 1 1 0, respectively, for emotionfocused, information-focused and control conditions. As per O’Connor et al.,24 preferencevalue consistency was assessed by comparing
the multiple correlation coeﬃcients between
participants’ values and their preferences for
Depo-Provera and Mirena across conditions.
The experiment-wise error rate for the planned
contrast analyses was controlled at the 0.05 level
using the Bonferroni procedure, with a critical
value of F1,145 = 5.98 (or P < 0.017). For all
other analyses, a P-value of <0.05 was considered statistically signiﬁcant.

Results
Demographic and health characteristics
One hundred and forty-eight women participated in the study (response rate 88.1%). The
sample characteristics are summarized in
Table 1, and there were no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the conditions.
Manipulation checks
The means of the manipulation checks scores
are displayed in Table 2. Planned contrast
analyses revealed little success in the instructional manipulations and emotion-focused DA
modiﬁcations. Only one signiﬁcant diﬀerence
was found, indicating that participants in the
information-focused condition felt signiﬁcantly
less negative emotion compared with participants in the emotion-focused condition. This
result, however, was not conﬁrmed by the
negative aﬀectivity subscale of the PANAS, as
indicated in the next paragraph.
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Variable
Age
Familiarity
Depo-Provera
Mirena

17 (36)
31 (65)
0 (0)

39 (81)
9 (19)
36 (75)
31 (65)
3 (6)
19 (40)
23 (48)
6 (12)
35 (73)
4 (8)

11 (23)
13 (27)
35 (73)

Familiarity (0–10).
1
Chi-square analyses could not be performed, as the values did not
meet the minimum expected amount.
2
Responses are only from participants who have had sexual
intercourse. Chi-square analyses could not be performed on the
‘Other’ option, as the values did not meet the minimum expected
amount.
3
Chi-square analysis compared Australia and a grouped variable
containing the other categories, as the values did not meet the
minimum expected amount.

Mood and anxiety
Mean diﬀerences in positive and negative aﬀectivity and anxiety from pre- to post-intervention
are shown in Table 3. There was a signiﬁcant
decrease in positive aﬀectivity (F1,145 = 31.47,
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Table 2 Mean scores for the manipulation check variables
at post-intervention
Manipulation
check

Emotion
Mean (SD)

Information
Mean (SD)

Control
Mean (SD)

Detail/fact focus
Emotional
feelings focus
DA emotional
engagement
Feel negative
emotion
Feel positive
emotion

7.80 (2.14)
5.59 (2.40)

7.73 (1.77)
5.22 (2.87)

8.10 (2.01)
5.50 (3.12)

5.80 (2.40)

5.43 (2.88)

5.54 (2.69)

6.39 (1.86)a

5.08 (2.88)a

5.71 (2.76)

4.53 (2.01)

3.63 (2.58)

4.35 (2.25)

Manipulation check (0–10).
Paired letters indicate a significant difference between groups,
controlling for the EER at P < 0.017.

Table 3 Mean differences on positive affectivity, negative
affectivity and anxiety from pre- to post-intervention
Emotion
Mean (SD)
Positive
affectivity
Negative
affectivity
Anxiety

Information
Mean (SD)

Control
Mean (SD)

2.80 (4.36)

1.77 (5.62)

2.32 (4.81)

0.27 (3.23)

0.94 (3.82)

0.90 (3.40)

1.57 (8.66)

0.70 (3.49)

1.32 (9.80)

Positive and Negative Affectivity (10–50). Anxiety (20–80).

P < 0.001) and increase in negative aﬀectivity
(F1,145 = 5.91, P = 0.016) from pre- to postintervention across the whole sample. However,
there was no signiﬁcant change in anxiety levels
from pre- to post-intervention, indicating that
the DA was not anxiety provoking. Planned
contrast analyses revealed no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between conditions at pre- or post-intervention, suggesting that the DA intervention
lowered participants’ mood regardless of
condition.
Decision-making outcomes
Mean knowledge, satisfaction and decisional
conﬂict scores across conditions are displayed in
Table 4. In the knowledge test, the average score
indicated good understanding of the DA.
Planned contrast analyses did not show any signiﬁcant diﬀerences between conditions on
knowledge.

Results of mean satisfaction with decision
revealed that participants were adequately satisﬁed with their decision. Planned contrast
analyses showed that participants in the emotion-focused and information-focused conditions were more satisﬁed with their decision
than those in the control condition. No significant diﬀerences between the emotion-focused
and information-focused conditions were
detected.
Planned contrast analyses showed that
there were no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between
conditions on total decisional conﬂict (or any
DCS Subscales). However, there were trends
for participants in the emotion-focused condition to show greater levels of total decisional
conﬂict compared with participants in the
control and information-focused conditions.
Participants in the emotion-focused condition
also showed a greater tendency to feel that
their decision was less in line with their values compared with participants in the control
condition.
Preference-value consistency was assessed by
comparing the multiple correlation coeﬃcients
between participants’ values and their postpreferences for Depo-Provera and Mirena
across conditions. As shown in Table 5, values
accounted for less variance in preferences for
both Depo-Provera and Mirena in the emotion-focused condition compared with the
information-focused and control conditions,
with values explaining a signiﬁcant amount of
variance only in the latter conditions. Thus,
the promotion of aﬀective processing reduced
decision-value consistency.

Discussion
The aim of this study was to examine the
eﬀect focused condition displayed lower
preference-value consistency and a tendency
for greater decisional conﬂict compared with
participants in the information-focused and
control conditions. In addition, participants in
the emotion-focused and information-focused
conditions showed higher levels of satisfaction
with decision than participants in the control

ª 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Health Expectations, 18, pp.2742–2752

Decision aid effectiveness, E L Davis et al.
Table 4 Means on knowledge, satisfaction and decisional conflict

Knowledge score
Satisfaction with decision (SWD)
Decisional Conflict Scale (DCS) total
Uncertainty subscale
Informed subscale
Values Clarity subscale
Support subscale
Effective decision subscale

Emotion
Mean (SD)

Information
Mean (SD)

Control
Mean (SD)

80.41
3.65
35.97
47.45
29.25
29.25
36.56
36.99

79.41
3.92
29.04
38.24
23.20
25.49
28.92
29.29

77.92
2.95
29.13
38.72
25.00
20.83
28.30
31.90

(13.84)
(0.58)a
(14.51)c,d
(22.58)
(15.32)
(19.92)e
(21.64)
(16.12)

(14.06)
(0.63)b
(15.12)c
(26.41)
(13.05)
(17.91)
(19.46)
(17.61)

(13.99)
(0.99)a,b
(13.78)d
(24.52)
(17.02)
(14.07)e
(17.84)
(16.12)

Knowledge score calculated as percentage of items correct. Satisfaction with decision.1–5 DCS scores range from 0 (no decisional conflict) to
100 (extreme decisional conflict); scores of 37.5 or less are associated with making a decision, and scores of 25 or less are associated with
follow-through with decision.31
Paired letters indicate a significant difference between groups, controlling for the EER at P < 0.017.
Paired letters indicate a trend of P = 0.02 between groups, controlling for the EER at P < 0.017.

Table 5 Multiple correlation coefficients from regressing
values on preferences
DepoProvera

Emotion-focused
Information-focused
Control

Mirena

R2

F

R2

F

0.08
0.32
0.28

0.49
2.51*
1.92

0.28
0.44
0.39

1.91
4.14**
3.15**

Significant at the 0.05 level.
Significant at the 0.01 level.

*

**

condition. Participants in the emotion- and
information-focused conditions did not diﬀer
signiﬁcantly in levels of knowledge compared
with the control condition.
Preference-value consistency was lowest in
the emotion-focused condition. Participants’
values were not predictive of preferences for
Depo-Provera or Mirena, and participants
were less likely to feel that their preference was
in line with their values compared with the
information-focused and control conditions.
Participants in the emotion-focused condition
also showed a tendency to have greater levels of
decisional conﬂict compared with participants
in the control condition. The reason for these
results is unclear, yet they support the assertion
of Bekker et al.11 that an individual’s aﬀective
reactions to the information in DAs may be a
key component in their decision making. Consistent with the current study’s results, they
found that emotional expression was associated
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with greater levels of decisional conﬂict immediately after using the DA and also at 1-month
follow-up. However, at follow-up, they found
that use of the DA overall resulted in lower levels of decisional conﬂict and led participants to
reﬂect more on how the decision ﬁt with their
values.18 Bekker et al.11 concluded that part of
the eﬀectiveness of DAs is the way in which
they help individuals assimilate their aﬀective
judgments in their decision making. In the current study, we only assessed outcomes immediately post-decision-making so we are unable to
comment on the impact of the emotion-focused
DA in the longer term. It may be that both the
emotion-focused and information-focused conditions need longer follow-up to show divergent
results. Nonetheless, the results warn against
encouraging a greater focus on emotional
feelings, as this appears to lead to at least a
short-term shift towards less consistency
between values and decision making.
Alternatively, it may be that the explicit focus
on aﬀective reactions in the emotion-focused
condition caused participants to disregard their
preferences and values. Evidence suggests that
people do not use aﬀect as information if its
relevance to the task is unclear,27 such as when
emotional feelings are attributed to a transient
external source.28 In the current study,
participants in the emotion-focused condition
may have attributed their feelings to the
manipulation and considered these instructions
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as irrelevant to their preferences. This may in
turn explain why participants in the
emotion-focused condition also showed a
tendency to have greater levels of decisional conﬂict compared with participants in the control
condition.
Attributing the emotions they were experiencing to the manipulation could have caused
them to doubt their preferences and thereby
compromise certainty of their choice. Thus
overall, the results caution against an explicit
focus on emotional feelings in DA practice
until further investigation.
The ﬁnding that emotion-focused participants
showed greater levels of decisional conﬂict yet
also signiﬁcantly greater levels of satisfaction
with the decision is of note. This ﬁnding
contradicts the notion that decisional conﬂict
and decisional satisfaction are inﬂuenced by similar factors. Indeed both the information- and
emotion-focused arms showed greater decisional
satisfaction. It is possible that the instructional
manipulation in both conditions enhanced the
salience of making a decision with added consideration of facts or emotions, leading these
participants to feel that they were being more
mindful of their decision regardless of how certain or content they were with that decision.
Thus, participants in the emotion-focused and
information-focused conditions may have felt
more satisﬁed with the decision-making process
compared with those in the control condition,
regardless of what they thought of their
decision. Future research comparing decisionmaking outcomes from DA-supported decisions
in which individuals naturally range from highly
emotive to highly analytical may be helpful in
clarifying this issue.
It has been suggested that aﬀective and deliberative styles of processing may enhance the
ability to acquire knowledge.29,30 However, in
the current study, it was found that levels of
knowledge in the emotion-focused and information-focused conditions were not signiﬁcantly
greater than the control condition. One important point of diﬀerence in the current study,
however, is that aﬀective and deliberative processing were not examined in isolation, but

rather in the context of a DA-supported
decision. Thus, the ﬁnding may reﬂect the ability
of a DA to enhance knowledge very eﬀectively.
Strengths & limitations
The study was the ﬁrst to the authors’ knowledge to experimentally assess the role of aﬀective and deliberative processing in DA
eﬀectiveness. The main strengths of the study
were the use of a theory-driven intervention and
a randomized experimental design. Through the
application of dual-process theory, the study
conducted was a theoretically driven investigation of the processes contributing to DA eﬀectiveness. There are also several limitations.
Firstly, the manipulation checks and mood
assessments indicated that the interventions
might not have been successful in promoting
aﬀective and deliberative processing. This may
have been because the interventions were not
powerful enough to shift participants’ processing, which has also been observed in previous
studies for the emotion-focused condition.12,20
It is also possible that the DAs induced robust
deliberative processing across all conditions, as
supported by the high self-reported focus on
details/ facts across all conditions. However, the
conditions showed some divergent outcomes
suggesting that processing was altered in some
way. Further research is needed to understand
how processing was aﬀected in the diﬀerent conditions and how this impacts decision making.
Secondly, the modiﬁcations to the emotionfocused DA introduced a confound, such that it
cannot be determined whether the observed
eﬀects between groups were driven by diﬀerences between the standard and emotionfocused DA or the instructional manipulations.
Finally, the generalizability of the ﬁndings is
limited by the use of a female university student
population and a hypothetical decision.
Future research
Further research is needed to investigate the
eﬀects of deliberative and aﬀective processing
on DA eﬀectiveness in actual clinical decision-
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making settings and with a larger, more diverse
sample. More direct assessment of processing
style, such as process-tracing methods (e.g.
think-aloud protocol and eye tracking), may be
useful to understand the eﬀects of this type of
intervention with greater clarity. It would also
be helpful to consider alternative ways of
investigating decision- or preference-value consistency (e.g. purpose-designed items to assess
whether participants evaluated the information
in accord with their values).

2

3

4

5

Conclusions
This study used a theory-driven intervention to
investigate the eﬀect of aﬀective and deliberative
processes in DA-supported decision making,
with implications for the design and use of DAs.
The results suggest that at least in the short
term, the promotion of aﬀective processing may
hinder value-consistent decision making, while
both aﬀective and deliberative processing may
enhance satisfaction in decision making. Pending further investigation on the long-term eﬀects
of promoting aﬀective and deliberative processing, it is tentatively suggested that the eﬀectiveness of DAs may be enhanced with respect to
satisfaction with decision by incorporating a
simple instruction to focus on the facts and
details of the information.
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